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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

Case No. 960085-CA
Priority No. 2

KRAIG JAMES CANFIELD,
Defendant-Appellant,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant-appellant, Kraig James Canfield, appeals a trial court
order denying his motion to withdraw a guilty plea to one count of forcible
sodomy, a first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403(2)&(3), The
appealed-from order was entered by the Sixth Judicial District Court in
Sevier County, Utah, Honorable David L. Mower, Judge, presiding. This
Court has jurisdiction by transfere from the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)(Supp. 1995).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPEALLATE REVIEW
This case presents two issues for review.
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the motion was untimely ?
This question involves contested facts pertaining to procedures for the
submission of a request to withdraw a guilty plea which may be jurisdictional and can be reviewed De Novo for correctness by this court. See State
v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 581-84 (Utah App. 1992)(treating timeliness of plea

withdrawal motion as jurisdictional question of law).
2.

Did the trial court properly deny defendantfs motion on the

express alternative ground that defendant did not show good cause ?
A trial court!s denial of a timely plea withdrawal motion is deferentially
reviewed on appeal for "abuse of discretion." State v Gardner, 844 P.2d
293, 295 (Utah 1992);State v Thorup, 841 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1992), cert,
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES and RULES

United States Constitution, Amendments V, VI and XIV. Utah State
Constitution, Articles

I, Sections VII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XXIV.

Article V, Section I. Utah Code Ann., Sections 76-1-105, 76-1-501, 76-2-101,
76-2-102, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-406. Utah Criminal Code, Section 77-136 and Utah Judicial Code, Section 78-2-2(4). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
5 and 6. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 2, 3, 11 and 30. Utah Rules of
Evidence 103, 401, 402 and 403.

Defendant expressly denies each and every allegation of Appellee
not expressly admitted herein.

This is a Reply Brief submitted pursuant

to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) and is to be incorporated with
Appellant Brief in the instant case.
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ARGUMENT
1.

TIMELYNESS OF REQUEST
'_... .,..-. . .i_

caju, the question at this point is whether Defendant was

reasonably informed by the court as required by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) that states in relevant i.sr'

f

(f)
Fail ure to advise the defendant c: m e time limits for filing
any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be
the ground for extending the ti me to make a mo"Mnr> i inder Secti on
77-13-6.

On 04 Octet-- : 1'n*'. ^ i ial <<;;:>

issued the following order (R.116-17} lu

Defendant that states in rel< \ . '

"'
, likely j
•.
i -.ee each other again. Thei e ! s
a couple of things you need to know about, before you leave. Youfve
pled guilty today. You've got 30 days from today to change your
mind about pleading guilty, but you can only change your mind if
you ask me in writing and if I give you permission to change your
mind. ITm not saying whether I would or wouldn't give you permission, but my point is to tell you that there's a deadline for asking and it's 30 days from today. So if vou don't ask then, you'll
never get a chance to even talk about; it ."

Appellee has relied upon State v Price, 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992) as
to the jurisdictjonal nature of Section 77-13~-6(b) under the exception jn
Rule I K O

nllowirig the 30 d n deadline t

••

.\t. :..!,•

•..( ,.nri:i..t i,-,,

betMi j)](tj'cr<) • niormea -.•! L:IU requirements oi the rule due to omission ol ati
essential requirement from t lie rule nv icrord. See also State v Maguire, 830
P.2d

>l^ '»'* ^

•' '

M;r Court Ordnr dots ^ ' •• • '

must uu liieu wiLii m e cnur: ^-.-i k am!

IJLIOJO

the '„) days expire.

Defendant was refered to as Mr. Doe in these proceedings.
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Defendant

was merely informed that he had 30 days to ask permission to change his mind
about pleading guilty and to do that in writing.

Such notice was ambiguous

and does not substantially conform to language of Section 77-13-6

2

* or the

requirements of Rule 11. Defendant has not challenged the jurisdictional
nature of Section 77-13-6 but rather the procedure for compliance under the
restricted conditions imposed upon him.

The lack of reasonable notice of

what and how to act pursuant to the correct rules has further served to impare his right to act within the context of the law or order of the court.
Accordingly, the case at bar qualifies for the exception under Rule 11(f)
for extention of time. Defendant only refered to tlie ff prison mailbox rule "
as an analogous case because that court addressed appropriate procedure for
the filing of a motion for discretionary post conviction relief subjected to
prison mail procedure and relevant court rules rather than the strict Rule
of appellate procedure for Notices of Appeal even though both are jurisdictional in nature.

Defendant did not receive fair or reasonable notice of how

to act to preserve his right to proceed and complied substantially with the
order of the court within the relevant time period.
Finally, Defendantfs request should be considered timely because trial
court overreached the impediment and ruled on the merits of the question by
stating an expressed alternitive ground of not based upon good cause shown
and thus de facto considered is as timely. See State v Parker, 235 Utah Adv.
Rep. 36, citing State v Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992)(per curiam).
After several months, Defendant enquired

about his request and was given a

Briefing Order (R.51-52) whereby he submitted a memorandum (R.72-86) in the
~2
U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be made within 30 days after entry of the
plea.
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support of his request. The Court accepted the memorandum and the appellee
responded.

Counsel for defendant withdrew (R.49-50) and court ordered plea

hearing transcript.(R.43-44)

It was apparent that court had acted in review

of the merits of defendantTs cause treating his request as timely.
2.

GOOD CAUSE WAS DEMONSTRATED
There is a presumption against a post-sentencing motion to withdraw pleas

of guilty.

Court will grant such a request only to correct a manifest injust-

ice. See United States v Teller, 762 F.2d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 1985). Defendant
asserted that there was no legal or factual basis for the valid establishment
of guilt contending that the omission, " waiver f!, of an essential element of
over fourteen altered the charging terms under U.C.A. § 76-5-403, Such waiver
would have the effect of creating a distinctly new and different crime which
was not intended by the legislature and could not be sentenced under U.C.A.
§ 76-5-406(9) or (11) as a first degree felony.

Additionally, had the waiver

been made envolving substance of the nature of crime then it also stands as
waived for purposes of sentencing under § 76-5-403(2)&(3) regarding to young
to consent. Otherwise enforcement of a conviction would only distort the
mens legis as well as mens rea of the statute as the legislature intended.
Defendant has not seen a copy of the minute entry commemorating the only
preliminary hearing held outlining the State's evidence against him. (R.21)
He pled not guilty at those proceedings and maintained his innocence throughout under the original charges. No gun was found even though the police did
look for one and E.Q. had testified that Defendant said he would not hurt him
at that hearing.

Evedence taken from E.Q. was inconclusive and not directly

connected to the defendant by D.N.A. compairson or otherwise. (Br. of the
appellee at 3)(..., bodily fluid samples were taken from Canfield, although
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the record does not reveal the result of any fluid comparison testing.) and
Defendantfs account of the incident is remarkably different from that of E.
Q..

He is still denying that he ever sought E.Q. to victimize or threaten

him.

Police stated that they found defendant asleep in the back yard. He

has no recollection of them arriving or handcuffing him nor could he assist
his court appointed counsel with details sufficient enough to aid in his
defense.

E.Q. testified however, that defendant said he would not hurt him.

In State v Jackson, 721 P.2d 232 (Kan. 1986) the court found in very
similar circumstances that;" A conviction based upon an information which does
not sufficiently charge the offense for which the accused is convicted is void.
Failure of an information to sufficiently state an offense is a fundamental
defect which can be raised at any time, even on appeal." Id. at 235. Such an
omission, " waiver tT, of an essential element necessary for both jurisdiction
and substance is an alteration of the charging terms that fails to charge an
offense as the legislature intended.

This has also deprived Defendant of his

right to be enabled to plead a conviction thereunder in bar of another prosecution for the same offense violating his protection against double jeopardy
guaranteed by the constitutions of Utah and the United States. Constructive
amendments are prejudicial per se and its not likely Defendant would have or
could have been found guilty under the original charges. That would require
a jury to supply, by intendment, material fact (bodily fluid taken from E.Q.
belonged to defendant) not held in evidence. See People v Hill, 3 Utah 334,
3 P. 75 (1884).

The information charges no crime as a first degree felony

in its present form.

Defendant was apprised of the substance of § 76-5-403

as a class B misdemeanor (R.108) when court instructed him of what the State
would be required to prove in order for a jury to find him guilty of forcible
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sodomy.

No correction was entered and Defendant believing what the court

said was availed to rely on that information in wieghing the benefits and
risks of going to trial or entering a plea.
In Utah a court has no right, when language employed by legislature in
statute is unambiguous, to make, by construction, exceptions or qualifications to meet hardship of particular case; for court to do so would be usurpation of legislative power. See Smith v Schwartz, 21 U. 126, 60 P.305, 81 Am.
St. Rep. 670. But see also, Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v Tatum, 58
F.3d 1101 (6th Cir. 1995)(quoting United States v Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Weat)
76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820)(Marshall,C.J.)("[i]t is the legislature, not the
court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment11). Id. at 1105.
No omission or

rf

waiver

fr

could have been made of the over fourteen element

contained in § 76-5-403 in order to avoid sentencing defendant under a mandatory sentence.

A five-to-life is available under both the original charges

and § 76-5-403 and was no benefit to defendant.

A waiver of that element is

a waiver in the entirety which reduces the charge to a class B misdemeanor as
apprised by the court. (R.108).

A conviction under § 76-5-403 as a first

degree felony must be considered void and a manifest injustice that has deprived defendant of his constitutional rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
See United States v Cannon, 116 U.S. 55, 6 S.Ct. 278, 29 L.Ed 561 (1885) and
Russell v United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 8 L.Ed.2d 240, 82 S.Ct. 1038
[1046-47] (1962).
This aspect was presented in defendantTs memorandum and is examined in
Menna v New York, wherein " We do not hold that a double jeopardy claim may
never be waived.

We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not

waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State

- 7 -

may not constitutionally prosecute." Federal law requires that a conviction
on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a
counseled plea of guilty. Id. at 62. See also U.S. v Kaiser, 893 F.2d 1300,
1303 (11th Cir. 1990)(applying the Menna/Blackledge, exception). (R.78) In
Utah a Defendant does not have a right to plead guilty but does have a right
to be enabled to bar another prosecution for the same offense with a guilty
plea thereunder.

The waiver has created a non-crime as a first degree felon}

which the State cannot constitutionally prosecute and as such the appropriate
remedy is to reduce the conviction under that statute to the lesser included
crime that is not jeopardy-barred.
48 (1986).

See Morris v Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 244-

The State should not be allowed to continue to reprosecute the

Defendant over and over until they obtain some sort of conviction that suits
them.

The Constitutions of Utah and the United States prohibit that. See,

United States v Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2192, 57 L.Ed.2d 65
(1978)(quoting, Green v United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221,
223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957)).
Because the 5-to-life sentence imposed on defendant was available under
any of the original charges for a conviction, any waiver of the essential
over fourteen element was an absurdity of no benefit to defendant and only
operates to violate his substantial rights to his prejudice by depriving
him of a grand jury, to be honestly informed of the crime for which he pled
guilty and was sentenced for, and the right to plead a conviction in bar of
another prosecution for that offense.

See United States v Kelly, 722 F.2d

837, 876 (1st Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1070, 104 S.Ct. 1425, 79
L.Ed.2d 749 (1984).

Constructive amendments of charging terms cannot be a
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choice among alternative courses of action open to defendant and counsel's
advice fails to fall within the range of competence demanded of attorneyTs
in criminal cases,
citing, Blackledge).

(Teller, supra at 5) But see also (Menna supra at 62
Counsel also failed to apprise Defendant of probabi-

lity of" an acquittal or mis trial had he gone to trial. Juries cannot be
expected to supply material facts not held in evidence. Utah Code Annotated
§ 76-1-501 requires that the State prove all elements beyond a reasonable
doubt and Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-101 requires that that conduct be within
the definition of the offence as the definition of the offense requires. A
counsel appointed by the court still has a duty to assist a defendant with a
proper defense including correct legal advise and protection of his substantial rights under the XIV Amend, of the U.S. Constitution.

Counsel failed Mr.

Canfield drastically and did not appeal or assist with the request to withdraw an invalid plea of guilty.

This underminds the confidence in the out-

come of the present proceedings which does not represent a mere factual incongruency.

Certainly, had the case gone to trial, there was a probability

that a more favorable outcome would have resulted in defendantfs behalf.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Court should Reverse the trial
court's conviction of defendant as a first degree felony and Remand this
case for resentencing defendant under U.C.A., § 76-5-403 as a class B misdemeanor.

In the alternative, all charges should be dismissed with prejudice

vacating the commitment and releasing defendant forthwith from custody of the
Department of Corrections.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Mill day of AJhil
, 1996.
faritl Owl*
Kraig James Canfiel
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Kraig James Canfield, hereby certify that I have
mailed, first class postage prepaid, two true and correct
copies of the foregoing Motion for Variance and Appellant's
Reply Brief to J.Kevin Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, at
the following address:
J.Kevin Murphy
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

on the 25th

day of

OJ^M4

, 1996

Kraig^James Canfield

cc: R. Don Brown
Sevier County Attorney
250 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701

APPENDIX I
LETTER
Note of officer J.R. Wheeler, Star 2 facility
(3-27-96) , REGARDING TIME TO PROCESS MAIL.
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Kraig James Canfield
P.O. Box 250 USP 23287

Star 2,D-8-B

Draper, Utah 84020

To: Clerk
Utah Court Of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re: State v Canfield, Case No. 960085-CA
Date:

aMsvii ifn,im>

Dear Clerk,
Please find enclosed original and seven copies
of Motion for Variance and Reply Breif of Appellant for filing
in the above-captioned case.
se.

I am indigent and proceeding pro

Therefore, I've found it necessary to request a variance

from proceedure in filing regarding the binding and cover of
my Appellant brief.

We do not have such means available to us

here at the prison.
Please file my Reply Breif and notify me of any
further action in my case.
Thank you,

fytUl faflfid/
ames Canfield, Appellant
Utah State Prison, 23287
P.O. Box 250 Stat 2, D-8-B
Draper, Utah 84020
cc: Utah Attorney General
J.Kevin Murphy
Seveir County Attorney
R. Don Brown

KRAIG JAMES CANFIELD
UTAH STATE PRISON
P.O. BOX 250
DRAPER, UTAH 84020
Appearing pro se
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Motion for Variance
Rule 27(d) U.R.APP.P,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

Case No. 960085-CA

KRAIG JAMES CANFIELD,

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant

COMES NOW, Kraig James Canfield, Defendant and
Appellant, and moves this court pursuant to Rule 27(d) Utah
Rules Of Appellate Procedure and requests a variance from
Rule 27. Form of briefs., in filing of Appellant Reply Brief
Good Cause
Defendant-Appellant is proceeding indigent and
pro se with this appeal. He does not have the means to bind
or cover his brief as required by Rule 27 and respectfully
requests the court grant him an exception.
Submitted th is ^^fflday of <2<d*uX

, 1996.

Kraig James Canfield
Defendant-Appellant

KRAIG JAMES CANFIELD
P.O. Box 250 USP 23287

Star 2, D-8-B

Draper, Utah 84020

To: Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re: State v Canfield,

Case No. 960085-CA

Date April 3, 1996
Dear Clerk,
I am the Defendant-appellant in the above-captioned case
and Ifm writing to request an extention of time to file my Reply Brief in
response to the important questions presented in the Brief of Appellee. I
am indigent and will need a few days extra to obtain the required copies
necessary pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Additionally, Ifm attempting to search for the controlling
case law pertaining to " waiver " or stipulation to omit any essential
elements of a crime charged. I cannot find anything as of this date other
than State v Holt, 104 Wash. 2d 315, 320, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985). wherein
the court held:
n

[t]he omission of any statutory element of a crime in
the charging document is a constitutional defect which
may result in dismissal of the criminal charges."
Consequently, I may find it necessary to submit a request
for supplimental authority from another State that may be analogous to a
Utah opinion.
Please file my request for extention of time to submit a
Reply Brief and notify me if it is granted.
Thank you,

Kraig Canfield, Appellant

cc: Utah Attorney General
Sevier County Attorney

